INTRODUCTION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India delivered a significant judgment on 28.11.2025, in the matter of “Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. vs Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited” addressing critical questions concerning the review jurisdiction of High Courts under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the enforceability of arbitration agreements containing unilateral appointment clauses. The judgment reinforces the foundational principle that arbitration, being rooted in party autonomy, must be protected from unwarranted judicial interference while maintaining the delicate balance between oversight and independence. 

At its core, the dispute centered on whether an arbitration clause providing for unilateral appointment by one party, which subsequently became unenforceable due to statutory amendments, could be severed to allow the substantive arbitration agreement to survive. Additionally, the case examined whether a High Court possesses jurisdiction to review its own order appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act, particularly when such review is sought years after the appointment and extensive arbitral proceedings have taken place.

FACTUAL MATRIX 

Award of Contract and Dispute Resolution Clause

Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Limited (“BRPNNL”) awarded a contract to Hindustan Construction Company Limited (“HCCL”) on 4 March 2014 for construction of a bridge over River Sone across the districts of Aurangabad and Rohtas, Bihar. The contract incorporated Clause 25, which provided a multi-tier dispute resolution mechanism culminating in arbitration.

First Round of Disputes and Arbitration

During execution of the works, HCCL raised claims before the Deputy Chief Engineer seeking compensation for additional costs and losses incurred during the original contract period. Upon receiving no response, HCCL escalated the dispute to the Managing Director and subsequently issued a notice invoking arbitration. As the Managing Director failed to appoint an arbitrator, HCCL approached the Hon’ble Patna High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“A&C Act”). Vide order dated 02.08.2019, the Hon’ble High Court appointed Justice P.K. Sinha (Retd.) as the sole arbitrator. The arbitral proceedings culminated in an award dated 31.12.2021, which BRPNNL accepted and satisfied without challenge, thereby affirming the arbitration mechanism under Clause 25.

Second Round of Disputes: Extended Period Claims

Fresh disputes arose concerning extension of time and compensation for costs incurred during the extended period of the project. HCCL again followed the contractual dispute resolution hierarchy by approaching the Deputy Chief Engineer and thereafter the Managing Director. Upon continued inaction, HCCL issued a notice dated 10.01.2020 seeking appointment of an arbitrator.

Second Section 11 Petition and Arbitral Proceedings

HCCL filed a second petition under Section 11, registered as Request Case No. 53 of 2020, before the Hon’ble Patna High Court. Vide judgment dated 18.08.2021, the Hon’ble High Court appointed Justice Shivaji Pandey (Retd.) as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate disputes arising out of the 2014 contract. Arbitral proceedings commenced on 13.09.2021 and continued over the next three years, with more than seventy hearings conducted. Both parties filed pleadings, led evidence, and jointly sought extensions of the arbitrator’s mandate under Section 29A on multiple occasions. The Ld. Arbitrator granted the first extension vide order dated 11.03.2023, followed by further extensions granted by the Hon’ble High Court on 13.10.2023 and 10.05.2024. By this stage, final arguments on behalf of HCCL had been concluded, and the proceedings were at an advanced stage.

Review Proceedings and Impugned Judgment

In 2024, BRPNNL filed Civil Review Application No. 293 of 2024, seeking review of the order dated 18.08.2021, citing the subsequent appointment of Justice Shivaji Pandey as President of the Meghalaya State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. By order dated 4 October 2024, the High Court reviewed its earlier order and directed the Ld. Arbitrator to cease further proceedings, while indicating that the matter would be listed for appointment of a new arbitrator. However, instead of merely substituting the arbitrator, the Hon’ble High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 09.12.2024, dismissed the Section 11 petition itself, effectively nullifying the ongoing arbitration. Aggrieved by this decision, HCCL preferred the present appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

Appellant’s Submissions: –

• The appellant argued that the Hon’ble Patna High Court lacked jurisdiction to review its earlier order dated 18.08.2021 passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act, by which a sole arbitrator had been appointed. The order had attained finality and was never challenged by the respondents through appeal or other proceedings.
• It was submitted that the A&C Act is a self-contained code and does not confer any power of review upon the Hon’ble High Court. Consequently, the very act of entertaining the review petition was without authority and contrary to settled law governing Section 11 proceedings.
• The appellant pointed out that vide an interim order dated 04.10.2024, the Hon’ble High Court had merely directed that the matter be listed for appointment of a substitute arbitrator, owing to the subsequent appointment of the arbitrator as President of the Meghalaya State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. However, the impugned judgment dated 09.12.2024 went far beyond this limited scope and dismissed the Section 11 petition itself, thereby nullifying a subsisting judicial order.
• It was further argued that the review petition was hopelessly time-barred, having been filed more than three years after the appointment of the arbitrator and after the arbitral proceedings had substantially progressed. Even assuming a review to be maintainable, it could not have been entertained after such inordinate and unexplained delay.
• On merits, the appellant submitted that Clause 25 constitutes a valid arbitration agreement under Section 7 of the A&C Act. The clause clearly manifests the parties’ intention to refer disputes arising out of the contract to arbitration. The Hon’ble High Court’s conclusion that Clause 25 was not an arbitration clause was therefore erroneous and unsustainable.
• It was emphasized that the appellant had duly complied with the pre-arbitral procedure prescribed under Clause 25 and that the respondents never raised any objection under Section 16 before the arbitral tribunal. Instead, the arbitration proceeded for over three years, with more than seventy sittings, and both parties jointly sought multiple extensions under Section 29A.
• The appellant contended that reliance on the Bihar Government notification dated 14 August 2019, amending the Standard Bidding Document, was misplaced, as it could not operate retrospectively to alter the terms of a contract executed in 2014.
• It was further submitted that an arbitration agreement does not become void merely because the authority designated to appoint the arbitrator becomes ineligible. The Hon’ble High Court erred in holding that arbitration itself became impossible because the Managing Director of BRPNNL could no longer act as the appointing authority.
• The appellant relied on TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. and Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., as affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), to contend that unilateral appointment of arbitrators is impermissible, and the only lawful remedy in such cases is judicial appointment under Section 11(6).
• It was also submitted that having fully participated in the arbitral proceedings and sought extensions, the respondents were estopped under Section 4 of the A&C Act from belatedly challenging arbitrability, as held in Narayan Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia and Gayatri Project Ltd. v. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd.
• Accordingly, the appellant prayed for setting aside of the impugned judgment and restoration of the arbitral proceedings.

Respondent’s Submissions: – 

• The respondents contended that the present dispute goes beyond the question of impermissible unilateral appointment and instead raises an issue of party autonomy, where the contract consciously restricts arbitration to a single prescribed mode and expressly excludes all alternative routes to arbitration.
• It was submitted that the precise issue, i.e., whether an arbitration clause that mandates unilateral appointment by one party and further provides that no arbitration shall lie if such appointment cannot be made, has not been directly adjudicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and therefore required authoritative determination.
• According to the respondents, Clause 25 comprises two distinct and independent parts. The first part provides for arbitration by an arbitrator appointed by the Managing Director of BRPNNL upon completion of pre-arbitral steps. The second part contains a negative covenant, expressly stipulating that if such appointment cannot be made, there shall be no arbitration at all.
• While accepting that unilateral appointment is unenforceable following the Constitution Bench decision in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), the respondents argued that the present clause is materially different. Unlike the clause in CORE, Clause 25 explicitly forecloses arbitration if the agreed appointment mechanism fails, thereby reflecting a deliberate contractual choice.
• It was submitted that in CORE, the arbitration clause did not provide that arbitration would cease if the appointment mechanism became unworkable. In contrast, Clause 25 expressly makes arbitration contingent upon appointment by the Managing Director, and failing such appointment, mandates resolution through courts.
• The respondents relied upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Kashish Developers, which considered an identical clause and held that following the 2016 amendment to Section 12, such clauses become otiose. It was emphasized that the Special Leave Petitions challenging the judgment in Kashish Developers were dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thereby affirming this interpretation.
• It was further contended that Clause 25 operates as a contingent contract under Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Once unilateral appointment became unenforceable in law, the contingency failed, triggering Section 33 of the Contract Act and activating the second part of Clause 25, which mandates that no arbitration shall take place.
• The respondents emphasized that party autonomy remains the cornerstone of arbitration, as reaffirmed in CORE, but courts cannot invoke party autonomy to rewrite contracts. Reliance was placed on Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, to argue that arbitration depends on the parties’ subjective will as expressed in the agreement.
• It was argued that appointing an arbitrator under Section 11 in the present case would amount to rewriting the contract, contrary to settled law. Reliance was placed on Venkataraman Krishnamurthy v. Lodha Crown Buildmart Pvt. Ltd., which holds that courts cannot create a new bargain for parties.
• The respondents also submitted that the two parts of Clause 25 are severable. Applying the doctrine of severability and the “blue pencil test” as recognized in Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. v. Jain Studios Ltd. and Beed District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and others, the unenforceable unilateral appointment mechanism can be severed while giving full effect to the surviving negative covenant excluding arbitration.
• It was further pointed out that the State of Bihar has consciously transitioned from ad hoc arbitration to institutional arbitration by amending the Standard Bidding Document through the Gazette Notification dated 14.08.2019, mandating reference to the Bihar Public Works Contract Disputes Arbitration Tribunal. This policy shift reinforces the respondents’ intent not to continue ad hoc arbitration under earlier contracts.
• In conclusion, the respondents submitted that the arbitration agreement stands rendered inoperative and unenforceable by operation of law, that Clause 25 expressly excludes arbitration if the Managing Director cannot appoint an arbitrator, and that the impugned judgment correctly holds that no arbitration agreement survives between the parties.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court identified three principal issues requiring determination in the appeal:

1. Whether the High Court possessed jurisdiction to review or recall its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act, and whether the exercise of such power was valid in law.
2. Whether a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement existed between the parties within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act, and whether Clause 25 of the contract satisfied the statutory requirements of a binding arbitration agreement.
3. Whether the joint applications filed by both parties seeking extension of the arbitrator’s mandate under Section 29A constituted an express or implied waiver of ineligibility under Section 12(5), when read with Section 4 of the A&C Act.

FINDINGS ON EACH ISSUE

Issue No. 1: Review Jurisdiction under Section 11(6)

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court did not possess jurisdiction to review or reopen its earlier order appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed, strikes at the heart of the legislative policy underlying the Act, which is premised on minimal judicial intervention, expedition, and finality of arbitral proceedings.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the A&C Act is a self-contained and exhaustive code, and by virtue of Section 5, judicial intervention is expressly restricted only to situations provided for under the statute. Proceedings under Section 11 are facilitative in nature and are intended to trigger arbitration, not to invite repeated judicial scrutiny. Once an arbitrator is appointed, the court becomes functus officio, and the arbitral process must proceed unhindered.
• Relying on BSNL and another v. Nortel Networks (India) Pvt. Ltd., the Hon’ble Court reaffirmed that the legislative intent of the A&C Act is to ensure that arbitration is conducted without unnecessary interference. This intent was further reinforced by the 2015 Amendment and the insertion of Section 11(6A), which confines the court’s role at the appointment stage to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement, thereby curtailing any wider adjudicatory inquiry.
• The Hon’ble Apex Court placed strong reliance on the seven-Judge Bench decision in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Stamp Act, 1899, In re, which authoritatively held that referral courts under Sections 8 and 11 must limit themselves to a prima facie determination and refrain from examining questions of validity, enforceability, or jurisdiction, these issues being reserved for the arbitral tribunal under Section 16. The judgment emphasized that what is not expressly permitted under the A&C Act is deemed to be prohibited, reinforcing the principle of judicial non-interference.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court further noted that while High Courts, as courts of record, possess a limited power of review, such power in arbitration matters is extremely circumscribed. Drawing from Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, the Hon’ble Court clarified that review is permissible only to correct procedural or patent errors, not to reopen questions of law or reinterpret the arbitration agreement on merits. Review on merits, unless expressly provided by statute, is impermissible.
• In the present case, the Hon’ble High Court had reopened the interpretation of the arbitration clause solely on the basis of subsequent judicial developments, which squarely fell outside the scope of permissible review. The Hon’ble Court also found it significant that the review petition was filed after an unexplained delay of nearly three years, during which the parties had actively participated in the arbitration and jointly sought extensions under Section 29A. 
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that once the Section 11 order had attained finality, the respondents’ remedies lay either in challenging the order before the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 136 or in raising jurisdictional objections before the arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the A&C Act. Having pursued neither course, and having acquiesced in the arbitral process, the respondents were estopped from reopening the matter through review.
• Accordingly, the Hon’ble Court held that the High Court’s exercise of review jurisdiction amounted to an appeal in disguise, violated the principle of minimal judicial interference, and was wholly unsustainable in law. The issue was therefore answered in the negative, holding that the Hon’ble High Court lacked jurisdiction to review its earlier Section 11 order.

Issue No. 2: Existence and Validity of Arbitration Agreement

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court answered this issue in the affirmative, holding that a valid and subsisting arbitration agreement exists between the parties within the meaning of Section 7 of the A&C Act, and that Clause 25, in its substantive form, satisfies the statutory requirements of an arbitration clause.
• The Hon’ble Court reiterated that Section 7 adopts a liberal and purposive approach to the existence of an arbitration agreement. While an agreement must be in writing, Section 7(4)(c) expressly recognises the existence of an arbitration agreement where it is evidenced through an exchange of statements of claim and defence, so long as one party asserts its existence and the other does not deny it. The emphasis, therefore, is on the intention of the parties to arbitrate, rather than on rigid formal requirements.
• Relying on S.N. Prasad v. Monnet Finance Ltd., State of West Bengal v. Sarkar & Sarkar, and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank, the Hon’ble Apex Court reaffirmed that active participation in arbitral proceedings without objection, coupled with exchange of pleadings, constitutes strong evidence of a valid arbitration agreement. Where parties have consciously invoked arbitration and acted upon it, they are estopped from subsequently denying its existence.
• Applying these principles to the facts, the Hon’ble Apex Court noted that arbitral proceedings had commenced pursuant to Clause 25 on 13.09.2021 and continued for over three years, during which both parties participated in more than seventy hearings, filed pleadings, paid arbitral fees, and sought extensions under Section 29A. The Hon’ble Court also found it significant that an earlier arbitration between the same parties, arising from the same contract and governed by the same clause, had culminated in an award that was accepted and implemented by the respondents without challenge. This consistent course of conduct unequivocally demonstrated a meeting of minds to arbitrate.
• On the construction of Clause 25, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it contains two distinct components: first, a clear and unequivocal mandate that disputes arising out of the contract shall be referred to arbitration; and second, a procedural stipulation vesting exclusive appointment power in the Managing Director and excluding arbitration if such appointment is not made. While the first component reflects a binding agreement to arbitrate, the latter introduces an arbitrary and exclusionary condition.
• The Hon’ble Court drew a clear distinction between the existence of an arbitration agreement and the validity of the appointment mechanism. Relying on TRF Ltd. (Supra), Perkins Eastman Architects DPC (Supra), and the Constitution Bench decision in CORE (Supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court reaffirmed that while a unilateral appointment mechanism is unenforceable, such invalidity does not extinguish the arbitration agreement itself.
• Invoking the doctrine of severability, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the offending portion of Clause 25, i.e., vesting unilateral appointment power and foreclosing arbitration, must be severed as void and unenforceable. The substantive agreement to arbitrate, however, survives. This position was reinforced by Offshore Infrastructures Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., where the Hon’ble Court held that courts are empowered under Section 11(6) to sever defective appointment procedures and appoint an independent arbitrator, lest one party be granted a veto to defeat arbitration altogether.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that in public-private contracts, arbitral arrangements must also withstand constitutional scrutiny under Article 14. The exclusionary sub-clause in Clause 25, employing the phrase “for any reason”, was found to be vague, arbitrary, and violative of the principles of equality and impartiality embodied in Section 18 of the A&C Act and Article 14 of the Constitution.
• In conclusion, the Court held that:

1. the parties’ conduct satisfies the requirement of Section 7(4)(c);
2. Clause 25, in its substantive form, constitutes a valid arbitration agreement;
3. the unilateral and exclusionary appointment mechanism is void but severable; and
4. the Court is empowered under Section 11(6) to cure the defect by appointing an independent arbitrator.

• Accordingly, the finding of the Hon’ble High Court that no arbitration agreement existed was held to be unsustainable in law and was set aside.

Issue No. 3: Waiver under Sections 4, 12(5) and 29A

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a joint application filed by parties under Section 29A constitutes waiver by conduct under Section 4 of the A&C Act, except in cases where a statutory ineligibility under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule is attracted. The Hon’ble High Court’s reliance on Section 12(5) to negate waiver in the present case was therefore found to be misplaced. 
• The Hon’ble Apex Court began by reiterating that waiver is a cornerstone of arbitral jurisprudence, designed to prevent parties from raising belated objections after having fully participated in the proceedings. The Act codifies waiver in Section 4, which deems a party to have waived its right to object if it proceeds with arbitration despite knowledge of non-compliance and without timely protest. This statutory scheme discourages tactical objections and ensures finality and procedural fairness.
• Distinguishing waiver from acquiescence and estoppel, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that while these doctrines often overlap conceptually, the A&C Act consciously incorporates only waiver, treating informed silence or participation as intentional relinquishment of rights.
• The Hon’ble Apex Court then examined the scope of Section 12(5), which introduces a mandatory disqualification for arbitrators falling within the Seventh Schedule and permits waiver only through an express written agreement entered into after disputes have arisen. Relying on Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. and Ellora Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Hon’ble Court reiterated that mere participation in proceedings cannot cure statutory ineligibility, and that implied waiver is expressly excluded in such cases.
• However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between statutory ineligibility under Section 12(5) and procedural waiver under Section 4. While the former concerns inherent jurisdictional defects, the latter governs objections arising from conduct, delay, or procedural non-compliance. In this context, the Hon’ble Court relied on Quippo Construction Equipment Ltd. v. Janardan Nirman Pvt. Ltd., which recognizes waiver by conduct where objections are not timely raised.
• Turning to Section 29A, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that a joint application seeking extension of the arbitral mandate reflects a high degree of consent and affirmation of the tribunal’s authority. Unlike routine participation, a joint invocation of Section 29A signifies conscious acceptance of the arbitral process and continuation of the tribunal’s mandate. Nevertheless, such consent cannot be equated with an express written waiver under the proviso to Section 12(5).
• Reconciling Sections 4, 12(5), and 29A of the A&C Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

1. Section 12(5) applies only to Seventh Schedule disqualifications and admits waiver solely by express written agreement;
2. Section 4 governs waiver by conduct in all other cases; and
3. Section 29A ensures continuity of proceedings and, when jointly invoked, evidences waiver under Section 4.

• Applying these principles, the Hon’ble Court held that since no Seventh Schedule disqualification was attracted in the present case, the respondents’ repeated joint applications under Section 29A amounted to waiver by conduct under Section 4. The respondents, having consciously consented to continuation of the arbitration, were therefore barred from raising belated objections.
• Accordingly, the issue was decided against the respondents, holding that their conduct constituted waiver under Section 4, and the Hon’ble High Court erred in invoking Section 12(5) to hold otherwise.

APPLICATION OF KASHISH DEVELOPERS

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the respondents’ reliance on State of Bihar v. Kashish Developers was misplaced and could not justify reopening the arbitral appointment in the present case. The Hon’ble Court observed that Kashish Developers was factually distinguishable, as the arbitrator in that case was appointed without affording the State an opportunity to oppose the request. In contrast, the present matter involved extensive pleadings, objections, and prolonged participation by both parties in the arbitral process.

Addressing the contention that Kashish Developers stood “affirmed” due to dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the Hon’ble  Supreme Court reiterated the settled position that a non-speaking dismissal of an SLP does not amount to affirmation of the reasoning of the judgment under challenge. Such dismissal merely reflects the Court’s refusal to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 and does not attract the doctrine of merger.

Relying on Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, P. Singaravelan v. District Collector, Tiruppur, and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Atul Kumar Dwivedi, the Hon’ble Apex Court reaffirmed that a non-speaking dismissal of an SLP does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 and does not elevate the underlying judgment to binding precedent. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Kashish Developers had no precedential application to the present case and could not be relied upon to unsettle a concluded Section 11 appointment.

CONCLUSION

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once the High Court had appointed an arbitrator under Section 11(6) in 2021, permitted the arbitration to proceed through more than seventy hearings, and extended the arbitral mandate twice under Section 29A, it could not subsequently invalidate its own appointment by invoking supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 on the basis of a later interpretation of a similar contractual clause. Such an approach undermines finality, certainty, and confidence in the arbitral process.
• The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the Hon’ble High Court’s subsequent interference on the validity of Clause 25 amounted, in substance, to an appeal disguised as supervisory review. If the arbitrator had become unable to act due to recusal or disqualification, the appropriate course in law was to appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 15(2), not to terminate the arbitration altogether.
• Relying on Yashwith Constructions (P) Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd., ACC Ltd. v. Global Cements Ltd., and Union of India v. Pradeep Vinod Construction Company, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that substitution of an arbitrator preserves continuity and that prior proceedings remain valid unless specifically objected to. The Hon’ble High Court’s decision to suspend the arbitration, instead of ordering substitution, was therefore contrary to settled law and warranted correction under Article 136.
• The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that restarting the arbitral process de novo would be inequitable and inefficient. Accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court was directed to appoint a substitute arbitrator within two weeks, who shall continue the proceedings from the stage at which they were interrupted and endeavour to conclude them within one year, subject to extension under Section 29A by consent.
• The Hon’ble Apex Court also took serious note of the conduct of the respondent public sector undertaking. It observed that the silence and inaction of the Managing Director, despite repeated notices, fell short of the standards expected of a State entity under Articles 14 and 298. Reiterating that the State must act as a model litigant, as held in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another and Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Mohan Lal, the Hon’ble Court issued a stern warning to the then Managing Director, cautioning against any recurrence of such neglect. 
• With these directions and observations, the appeal was allowed and the impugned judgment was set aside.

This judgment reaffirms cardinal principles governing arbitration law in India: the imperative of minimal judicial interference, the primacy of party autonomy, the doctrine of severability as applied to defective appointment clauses, and the distinction between review and appeal. It establishes that once a High Court has exercised its jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act to appoint an arbitrator, that order attains finality and cannot be reopened through review proceedings, particularly after substantial arbitral proceedings have taken place. The decision reinforces that the existence of an arbitration agreement is distinct from the validity of the appointment procedure, and that courts must adopt a purposive interpretation to give effect to the parties’ genuine intention to arbitrate rather than allow procedural impediments to defeat that fundamental contractual bargain.

Analysis by:  Mitali Umat (Associate)