Trademark law is a cornerstone of intellectual property that safeguards the distinctive symbols, words, and designs through which businesses establish their identity in the marketplace. It protects not only the commercial magnetism and goodwill painstakingly built by enterprises but also the interests of consumers who rely on trademarks as guarantees of origin, quality, and consistency. By preventing confusion, deception, or misappropriation, trademark law ensures fair competition and promotes consumer trust, thereby striking a balance between protecting proprietary rights and preserving the integrity of the market.

On August 14, 2025, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India delivered an important judgment in the case of Pernod Ricard India Private Limited & Anr. vs. Karanveer Singh Chhabra¹, which addresses significant aspects of trademark law in India. The judgment, authored by Justice R. Mahadevan, provides clarity on several crucial principles governing trademark infringement and passing off actions. The case offered the Hon’ble Court an opportunity to clarify the appropriate analytical framework for evaluating competing trademarks and provided insights into the evolving jurisprudence on trademark law.

FACTS OF THE CASE

• The appellants are engaged in the manufacture and distribution of wines, liquors, and spirits and are proprietors of several reputed whisky brands. Their house mark SEAGRAM’S was first registered in 1945 and has since been used extensively across product lines in India and internationally. The brand BLENDERS PRIDE was adopted in 1973, registered in 1994, and launched in India in 1995. Similarly, the brand IMPERIAL BLUEwas launched in India in 1997, and its device mark was registered in 2016. Both brands, alongside SEAGRAM’S, enjoy formidable goodwill and reputation in the domestic and international markets.
• In May 2019, the appellants discovered that the respondent was marketing whisky under the mark LONDON PRIDE. The impugned mark was alleged to be phonetically and visually similar to BLENDERS PRIDE and deceptively copied the colour scheme, get-up, and trade dress of IMPERIAL BLUE. Moreover, the respondent was using bottles embossed with the appellants’ house mark SEAGRAM’S, thereby compounding the alleged infringement and passing off.
• Aggrieved, the appellants instituted a civil suit before the Ld. Commercial Court, Indore, seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the respondent from infringing their registered trademarks, passing off, copyright infringement, and unfair competition. Alongside, the appellants filed an interlocutory application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC for interim relief to restrain the respondent from manufacturing, selling, or advertising whisky or related beverages under the mark LONDON PRIDE, or any other mark deceptively similar to their registered trademarks.

DECISION OF DISTRICT COURT AND HIGH COURT

• Vide order dated November 26, 2020, the Ld. Commercial Court, Indore dismissed the appellants’ interim injunction application. The Ld. Commercial Court held that the mere use of the word ‘PRIDE’ by the respondent could not amount to imitation of the appellants’ trademarks. It further noted that the balance of convenience did not favor the appellants.
• Aggrieved by this order, the appellants filed a Miscellaneous Appeal before the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore. The Hon’ble High Court, upon consideration of the material on record, concurred with the findings of the Ld. Commercial Court and held that the respondent’s use of the word ‘PRIDE’ was unlikely to mislead or confuse a consumer of average intelligence.
• The Hon’ble High Court observed that products such as those in question are generally identified and purchased by their complete names, or more commonly, by their first words. In the appellants’ trademark, the first word is ‘BLENDERS’, whereas in the respondent’s mark, it is ‘LONDON’. The Hon’ble High Court found that there was absolutely no deceptive similarity between the two.
• Furthermore, the Hon’ble High Court held that ‘PRIDE’ is a generic, commonly used, and laudatory expression, and that the dominant part of the appellants’ mark is ‘BLENDERS’. The Court also noted that the word ‘PRIDE’ is publici juris, common to trade, and cited the existence of 48 other trademarks containing the word ‘PRIDE’ registered under Classes 32 and 33, many of which are also registered with the Excise Authorities for sale of liquor.
• It was held that purchasers of premium and ultra-premium whiskey are presumed to be literate and discerning, and even an average consumer with imperfect recollection would readily distinguish BLENDERS PRIDE/ IMPERIAL BLUE from LONDON PRIDE.
• The Hon’ble High Court dismissed the appeal and directed the Ld. Commercial Court to proceed with the trial of the suit on merits and to dispose it of expeditiously.
• The appeal before the Hon’ble Apex Court arises from the judgment dated 03.11.2023 passed by the Hon’ble High Court dismissing the appellants’ challenge to the order dated 26.11.2020 of the Ld. Commercial Court.

ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

The primary question that arose for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the appellants were entitled to the grant of an interim injunction restraining the respondent from using the impugned trademark, get-up, and trade dress including the packaging of ‘LONDON PRIDE’ on the ground that such use amounted to infringement and/or imitation of the appellants’ registered trademarks, namely, ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY BOTH THE PARTIES

Appellant’s Contentions (Para 14)

1. The case involved elements of both trademark infringement and passing off, as the respondent had dishonestly adopted trademarks deceptively similar to the appellants’ registered marks.
2. The imitation of two established brands, i.e. ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’ by the respondent was not coincidental or innocent but a deliberate attempt to misappropriate the appellants’ goodwill and reputation.
3. The Appellate Court failed to apply the test of deceptive similarity laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in previous cases, where it was held that once the essential features of a registered mark are copied, differences in get-up, packaging, or additional writing are immaterial.
4. In an infringement analysis, the test is whether there is a likelihood of confusion or association in the mind of the public, which is a matter for judicial determination and not dependent on testimonial evidence.
5. The courts below erroneously dissected the mark ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’ and compared BLENDERS with LONDON, ignoring the distinctive and dominant component PRIDE, thus violating both the anti-dissection rule and the doctrine of overall similarity.
6. The Appellate Court wrongly presumed that consumers of IMFL (Indian Made Foreign Liquor) whisky are discerning and literate, thereby ruling out the likelihood of confusion. However, the test of imperfect recollection applies regardless of a consumer’s education or economic background.
7. The appellants have established a prima facie case of both infringement and passing off, as their marks have been in continuous and extensive use for over three decades and enjoy substantial goodwill.

Respondent’s Contentions (Para 15)

1. There is no deceptive similarity between ‘LONDON PRIDE’ and ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’. The words LONDON and BLENDERS are entirely different and constitute the dominant and distinctive elements of the respective marks.
2. The impugned order represents a proper and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the Ld. Commercial Court, which thoroughly evaluated the marks and packaging of both parties before arriving at its conclusion.
3. A holistic comparison of the trademarks and packaging reveals that the two products are clearly distinguishable. The goods of both parties are sold in sealed boxes, not loose, and the boxes themselves are visually distinct.
4. To obtain a temporary injunction, the appellants needed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience in their favor, and risk of irreparable harm. However, the appellants failed to satisfy these requirements as found out by the courts below.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 that were applicable to the case (Para 18):

1. Section 2(1)(h) defines “deceptively similar” as a mark that so nearly resembles another mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
2. Section 9(1) bars registration of trademarks that lack distinctiveness, are purely descriptive of goods/services (like quality, origin, purpose), or are customary/common terms in trade. However, such marks may still be registered if they have acquired distinctiveness or are well-known.
3. Section 11 provides relative grounds for refusal of registration, focusing on marks that are identical or similar to earlier trademarks and likely to cause confusion. It protects well-known trademarks, even for dissimilar goods.
4. Section 15 permits registration of a whole mark or distinctive parts of a mark, if a trademark has multiple elements. However, unless separately registered, exclusive rights are only in the whole, not its parts. Section 17 clarifies the extent of protection for registered trademarks, specifying that registration of a composite mark confers exclusive rights on the proprietor to use the mark as a whole, not its individual parts, unless those parts are separately registered.
5. Section 27 (2) recognizes the remedy of passing off, protecting unregistered trademarks by preventing others from using marks that mislead the public and protect the mark based on prior use. Section 28 outlines the rights conferred by registration, including the exclusive right to use the trademark and to obtain relief in respect of infringement.
6. Section 29 defines infringement, particularly emphasizing that a registered trademark is infringed when a sign is used in the course of trade that is identical or similar to the registered mark and is used for identical or similar goods or services, resulting in a likelihood of confusion.
7. Section 135 empowers courts to grant relief in suits for infringement or passing off, including temporary or permanent injunctions, damages, account of profits, and orders for seizure of infringing goods.

JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS RELIED UPON BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on several judicial precedents to analyze the issues at hand:

1. Coca-Cola Company of Canada Ltd. v. Pepsi-Cola Company of Canada Ltd.²: The Privy Council held that although both marks contained the common term “cola”, the word was descriptive in nature and not capable of exclusive appropriation. The essential and distinctive features of the competing marks were identified as “Coca” and “Pepsi”, which were held sufficient to distinguish the respective goods.
2. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products³: The Hon’ble Apex Court held that “Gluvita” was deceptively similar to “Glucovita.” Both words looked alike, sounded similar, and were used for identical goods (glucose-based foods), targeting the same class of consumers. This case established that the test for deceptive similarity is whether an average consumer of imperfect recollection would likely be confused. The Court stressed that marks should be considered as a whole and not dissected.
3. Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta⁴: The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that an average consumer does not dissect a trademark into its components or analyze its etymology but perceives the mark as a whole. The overall similarity in sound and structure was likely to cause confusion or deception. The case is a landmark precedent on deceptive similarity in medicinal products, highlighting that even partial similarity (like a suffix) can be enough to mislead the public.
4. Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories⁵: The Hon’ble Apex Court clarified the difference between infringement and passing off and held thatonce the essential features of a registered mark are copied, differences in get-up, packaging or additional writing are immaterial.
5. Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore⁶: The Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the test for deceptive similarity, emphasizing that the broad and essential features of the two marks are to be considered, not a side-by-side comparison to find differences. Since the defendant’s wrapper was so close to Parle’s that it could deceive or confuse an average buyer, it was held to be deceptively similar.
6. Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.⁷: The Hon’ble Supreme Court established that even minor differences may be insufficient if the overall impression conveyed by the marks is likely to deceive or cause confusion. It set a higher standard of trademark protection for pharmaceutical products, recognizing that confusion in this arena can pose serious health risks, not just inconvenience.
7. Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Scotch Whisky Association⁸: This case reaffirmed that the test of deceptive similarity must be applied holistically, having regard to the overall impression created by the mark, rather than focusing merely on phonetic or structural resemblance in isolation.
8. Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.⁹: The Hon’ble Supreme Court elaborated on the principles governing the grant or refusal of interim injunctions in trademark infringement and passing off actions, emphasizing that appellate courts ought to be circumspect in interfering with the discretionary orders of lower courts.
9. Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Tarkeshwar Prasad and others¹⁰: The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that while considering an application for a temporary injunction, the court must avoid conducting a mini-trial or delving into the merits of the case in detail.
10. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi and Others¹¹: The Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed the narrow scope of appellate interference with orders granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions. It was stated that interference of the appellate court is justified only if the trial court’s order is arbitrary, capricious, perverse or against the settled principles of law, or if the trial court has ignored material facts or legal principles.

ANALYSIS & LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The Hon’ble Apex Court articulated several key legal principles in its analysis:

1. Similarity and Distinctiveness – Name, Colour Scheme, and Trade Dress [Para 31]

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized that trademark protection whether based on name, color combination, trade dress, or structural features, centers on a mark’s ability to distinguish the commercial origin of goods or services in the minds of consumers. The likelihood of confusion remains the cornerstone of both infringement and passing off actions.
• The strength of a trademark lies in its inherent distinctiveness or the distinctiveness acquired through use. Invented or coined marks are inherently distinctive and command the highest degree of protection, whereas descriptive marks must acquire secondary meaning to qualify for protection.

2. Anti-Dissection Rule [Para 32]

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed the anti-dissection rule, which requires trademarks to be viewed as a whole rather than broken down into their constituent elements. This approach reflects how consumers perceive trademarks based on their overall impression, encompassing appearance, sound, structure, and commercial impression.
• While Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act restricts exclusive rights to individual elements of a composite mark (unless separately registered), the anti-dissection rule remains a fundamental principle of trademark analysis, directing courts to consider marks in their entirety.

3. Dominant Feature Test [Para 33]

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court explained that the dominant feature test involves identifying the most prominent or memorable aspect of a mark that is likely to be retained in the consumer’s memory. This test recognizes that even when comparing marks as a whole, certain elements may be more distinctive or striking than others.
• While the anti-dissection rule and dominant feature test may appear to operate in tension, they are complementary principles. The former requires viewing the mark as a unified whole, while the latter acknowledges that within that whole, certain elements may be more influential in creating a commercial impression.

4. No Exclusive Right Over Common or Descriptive Terms [Para 34]

• The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that descriptive words denoting the character or quality of goods are not capable of exclusive appropriation, except where they have acquired distinctiveness through prolonged, continuous, and exclusive use.
• The word ‘PRIDE’ was found to be a laudatory and commonly used English term, extensively used as part of various trademarks in the alcoholic beverages industry. The Court took judicial notice of multiple registrations under Class 33 – such as McDowell’s Pride, Highland Pride, Royal Pride, and Pride of India – all incorporating the term ‘PRIDE’.

5. Average Consumer Test and Imperfect Recollection [Para 35]

• The Court emphasized that the assessment of deceptive similarity must be made from the perspective of an average consumer with imperfect recollection. This test recognizes that consumers rarely have the opportunity to make direct comparisons between marks and must rely on their memory, which is inherently imperfect.
• Applying these principles, the Court found that the rival marks were not deceptively similar. The appellants’ trademarks; ‘BLENDERS PRIDE’, ‘IMPERIAL BLUE’, and ‘SEAGRAM’S’ – conveyed distinct commercial impressions when compared with the respondent’s mark ‘LONDON PRIDE’.

6. Legal Principles Governing Grant of Interim Injunction

The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the grant of an interim injunction in trademark matters requires consideration of multiple interrelated factors, and the Courts continue to apply the principles from American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.¹² when deciding applications for interim injunctions in trademark disputes. [Para 36.3]

1. Prima Facie Case

• The plaintiff must establish a serious, triable issue.
• Frivolous or vexatious claims do not qualify.

2. Likelihood of Confusion/Deception

• Courts assess the probability of consumer confusion at a prima facie level.
• A detailed comparison of marks is reserved for trial.

3. Balance of Convenience

• Courts weigh the hardship to both parties.
• If refusal of injunction would irreparably harm the plaintiff’s goodwill or cause consumer deception, balance tilts in favour of granting relief.

4. Irreparable Injury

• Harm to reputation or consumer trust is hard to quantify.
• In trademark cases, irreparable injury is generally presumed once confusion is shown.

5. Public Interest

• Courts consider whether the injunction serves consumer protection and market integrity.
• This factor becomes especially important in goods affecting health or safety.

POST-SALE CONFUSION [Para 40]

The Hon’ble Supreme Court discussed the recent development in trademark jurisprudence concerning the principle of post-sale confusion, with reference to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v Dream Pairs Europe Inc and another¹³.

Post-sale confusion refers to the confusion that occurs not at the point of purchase, but rather after the product has been bought and is seen in use by others. This form of confusion can arise when a consumer knowingly purchases counterfeit goods, or when products are inspired from more premium offerings. While the purchaser may not be deceived, the public at large may be misled into associating the infringing goods with the original brand, thereby diluting the brand’s reputation and goodwill.

The underlying harm in post-sale confusion lies in the deceptive appearance of legitimacy, which can impair the distinctiveness and perceived exclusivity of the genuine product. This is especially relevant in sectors like fashion, luxury goods, automobiles, and food items, where brand visibility and public perception are essential aspects of consumer engagement and brand equity.

However, the Hon’ble Apex Court noted that in the present case, the goods in question (whisky) are not intended for public display and are for private consumption. Therefore, the doctrine of post-sale confusion, while significant, was not directly applicable to the facts of this particular matter.

FINDINGS BY THE SUPREME COURT

After a comprehensive analysis, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the following findings:

1. Deceptive similarity not exact imitation: The Court reaffirmed that deceptive similarity does not require identical marks. The test is whether the marks create a likelihood of confusion or association among average consumers with imperfect recollection. In this case, the Court found no such confusion [Para 41].
2. Overall impression over dissection: Marks must be assessed as a whole rather than by dissecting components. While dominant features can guide analysis, the overall impression governs. Here, the Court noted that the appellants themselves attempted to dissect marks (claiming exclusivity over “Pride” and colour blue), which was contrary to this principle [Para 42].
3. Statutory framework on exclusivity: Under Sections 17, 27, and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, protection applies only to registered marks, and descriptive/common elements without secondary meaning are not protected. In this case, “Pride” is generic and not independently registrable [Para 43].
4. Distinctive elements and packaging: The dominant components, i.e., ‘Blenders’, ‘Imperial Blue’, and ‘London’ are visually and phonetically distinct. Branding, packaging, trade dress, bottle shape, labels, and cartons differ materially, reducing any likelihood of confusion [Para 45].
5. Consumer base: The products are premium/ultra-premium whiskies, purchased by discerning consumers who exercise greater care. This further lowers the risk of confusion between the marks [Para 46].
6. Rejection of hybrid or piecemeal claims: Attempts to combine features of multiple marks (‘Blenders Pride’ + ‘Imperial Blue’) to attack ‘London Pride’ were deemed legally untenable. Each mark must be assessed independently [Paras 50 & 52].
7. Evidence insufficiency: Allegations regarding embossing (“Seagram Quality”) or counterfeiting lacked credible evidence. Appellants failed to provide invoices or witnesses, rendering their claims unreliable [Para 48].
8. Prior rulings and estoppel: Earlier challenges to other uses of “Pride” were dismissed, and appellants had no independent registration for the word “Pride.” They were estopped from asserting such rights in the present case [Para 56].
9. No Prima Facie case: Applying the anti-dissection rule, the overall similarity test and the perspective of an average consumer, the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of deceptive similarity that could justify the grant of interim injunction [Para 44].

In conclusion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and directed the Ld. Commercial Court to proceed with the trial and dispose of the suit on merits, in accordance with law. The Hon’ble Court clarified that the judgment was confined to the adjudication of the application for interim injunction, based solely on the materials available at the interlocutory stage [Para 58].

KEY OBERVATIONS

The judgment in “Pernod Ricard v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra” reaffirms and refines core principles of trademark law while offering practical guidance for brand owners. By emphasizing the anti-dissection rule, the overall impression test, and the limits of exclusivity over common or laudatory terms like “Pride,” the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that protection rests on distinctiveness and consumer perception rather than fragmented ownership of generic elements. The ruling also underscores that interim injunctions in trademark disputes require a robust prima facie case, real likelihood of confusion, and equitable balance, rather than resting solely on assertions of reputation. For businesses, it highlights the need to invest in inherently distinctive branding strategies, while for the legal fraternity, it reflects an evolving jurisprudence that carefully balances proprietary rights, consumer protection, and market fairness.

Written By: Mitali Umat (Associate)

1 Civil Appeal No. 10638 of 2025

2 1942 SCC OnLine PC 7 : AIR 1942 PC 40 (5J)

3 AIR 1960 SC 142

4 AIR 1963 SC 449

5 AIR 1965 SC 980

6 (1972) 1 SCC 618

7 AIR 2001 SC 1952 : AIR 2001 SC 1952

8 2008 (10) SCC 723

9 1990 Supp SCC 727 : 1990 SCC OnLine SC 490

10 (2001) 5 SCC 568

11 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3538

12 (1975) AC 396

13 [2025] UKSC 25