BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sardari Lal v. Bhishan Dass & Ors, examined the legal principles governing proof of a Will under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (“Succession Act”) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”). The judgment reiterates that although execution of a Will may be formally proved through an attesting witness, the propounder of the will must also dispel all suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court. The judgment further clarifies the limited scope of interference by the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CPC”), 1908 in second appeals involving concurrent findings of fact. 

FACTS OF THE CASE

• The dispute pertained to agricultural land owned by Mr. Chhajju Ram (“the Testator”), who died intestate on 05.02.1992 without any children. Upon his demise, his widow Mrs. Bhambo Devi (“the Plaintiff”) claimed ownership over the suit property as his sole legal heir suit vide Civil Suit No.51/1993 against Bishan Daas and Ram Singh (“the Defendants”)  for declaration of the Plaintiff as the sole owner and in possession of the suit schedule property left by the Testator. Plaintiff also sought the relief of prohibitory injunction. 
• The Plaintiff claimed that Defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit schedule property; yet, on the basis of a forged will dated 06.11.1974, the Defendants got the revenue records mutated in their favour vide mutation no.66 dated 14.08.1992.
• The Plaintiff claims that her husband never executed any will; the Will is an act of fraud / undue influence and as such is void; her husband had no reason to disinherit the Plaintiff (i.e his wife); the Plaintiff was at time in possession of the suit schedule property and suit is filed as the Defendants declined to admit the plaintiff’s right over the suit schedule property.
• The Defendants claimclaims that the Plaintiff was aware of the registered Will dated 06.11.1974 and the mutation was sanctionedsanction on the 14.08.1992 in the presence of the Plaintiff. The Defendants claims that the Testator had bequeathed his entire movable and immovable properties in favour of the defendants; the will was executed in a sound state of mind, out of love and affection and as a reward for the services rendered by them to the testator and the Plaintiff, and they are still rendering service to the Plaintiff by providing her food, residence and other necessities of life.

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 

Before the Trial Court, the main issue was with as regards of execution of the will by Chhajju Ram in favour of the Defendants. To prove execution of the will, the Defendants produced three witnesses. The Trial Court, after appreciating the evidence, held that although the formal execution of the Will had been proved, the Defendants had failed to explain several suspicious circumstances regarding the validity of the Will. 

Trial Court observed that the Will was executed in the year 1974 and was-

1. Without details of the valueof value of ornaments and cash. 
2. Without details of property in possession of the Plaintiff,
3. Exclusion cannot be said to be bona fide and is  suspicious in the transaction,  as the plaintiff was having good relations with him and was putting up with him. The testator, if intendedtestator if intended to exclude the plaintiff from his estate despite these facts, hadfacts had no provision for her maintenance or any reason for her exclusion. Thus, this exclusion which remained unexplained does not appeal to the conscience of the court and is a suspicious circumstance regarding thequa validity of the Will in question or its execution.

FINDINGS OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

Aggrieved thereby, the Respondents preferred a First Appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the Original Plaintiff passed away and Mr. Sardari Lal (“the Appellant”) was brought on record as her legal representative. The First Appellate Court affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and upheld the decree in favour of the Appellant. . 

The Respondents,  thereafter preferred a Regular Second Appeal before the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh under Section 100 of the CPC, 1908. The Hon’ble High Court reversed the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below and upheld the validity of the Will, holding that its execution stood proved through the testimony of an attesting witness in terms of Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

Aggrieved by the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court, the Appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by way of Civil Appeal.  

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING PROOF OF WILLS

Before examining the validity of the impugned Will, the Hon’ble Supreme Court undertook a detailed survey of the settled jurisprudence governing proof of testamentary documents. Placing reliance upon H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamm, Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur, Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta, Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan, and Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coelho, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reaffirmed the settled position that the burden of proving a Will always rests upon its propounder and that such burden varies depending upon the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (“Succession Act”) prescribes the mandatory requirements for the execution and attestation of an unprivileged Will. The provision requires the Will to be attested by at least two witnesses, each of whom must have either witnessed the testator execute the Will or received an acknowledgment of such execution from the testator. Correspondingly, Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”) prescribes the mode of proving a Will by requiring the examination of at least one attesting witness, where available. 

However, the Hon’ble Apex Court clarified that compliance with Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act merely establishes the formal execution of the Will and does not, by itself, establish its genuineness. The propounder must further prove that the testator executed the Will voluntarily, in a sound disposing state of mind, with full knowledge of its contents and the nature and effect of the testamentary disposition. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further reiterated that where the execution of a Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, the burden upon the propounder becomes substantially heavier, requiring him to dispel every legitimate suspicion so as to satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court. The Court observed that there can be no exhaustive definition of “suspicious circumstances”, as the same would necessarily depend upon the facts of each case. Nevertheless, circumstances such as (a) the unnatural exclusion of legal heirs, (b) doubtful recitals in the Will, (c) active participation of beneficiaries in its execution, (d) unexplained alterations in the testamentary document, or (e) any circumstance casting doubt upon the free and voluntary execution of the Will warrant heightened judicial scrutiny. 

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF’S PLEADINGS AND NON-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES WERE SUFFICIENT TO DEFEAT THE SUIT?

The Respondents contended that the Original Plaintiff had adopted inconsistent pleas by simultaneously alleging that the Will was forged and that it had been obtained through fraud and undue influence. It was further submitted that the Original Plaintiff had failed to enter the witness box to substantiate these allegations and, therefore, the suit deserved to be dismissed. 

Rejecting the aforesaid contention, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Order VIII Rule 5 of the CPC, 1908  provides that every allegation of fact not specifically denied shall be deemed to have been admitted, while Section 58 of the Evidence Act dispenses with the requirement of proving admitted facts. Applying these provisions, the Court held that the Respondents had not specifically denied the Original Plaintiff’s status as the Testator’s widow and sole natural heir and, therefore, such fact required no further proof. 

Placing reliance upon Firm Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja PandaThe, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that alternative pleadings alleging fraud or undue influence do not amount to an admission of the execution of the Will, nor do they dilute a categorical plea denying its execution. The Court clarified that the burden of proving due execution and genuineness of a Will always remains upon its propounder and does not shift merely because the challenger fails to adduce evidence in support of an alternative plea. 

ISSUE II: WHETHER THE IMPUGNED WILL WAS SURROUNDED BY SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES?

The Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the existence of suspicious circumstances must be determined by considering the cumulative effect of all surrounding facts and not by examining each circumstance in isolation. Referring to Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, the Court observed that while evaluating the genuineness of a Will, the Court is entitled to consider the surrounding circumstances, the probabilities of the case and the intrinsic contents of the testament. 

Applying these principles, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the findings of the First Appellate Court that the Will was surrounded by several unexplained suspicious circumstances. The Court noted that the Testator had completely excluded his widow, despite the evidence demonstrating that she had continuously cared for him. The Respondents also failed to substantiate the recital that they had rendered such exceptional services to the Testator as would justify the exclusion of the sole natural heir.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court further examined the effect of the unexplained alterations appearing in the registration endorsement. Referring to Sections 32, 34, 35, 52, 58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act, 1908, the Court observed that these provisions require the Registering Officer to verify the identity of the executant, satisfy himself regarding due execution, and authenticate the registration endorsements. Where the registration endorsement itself contains unexplained cuttings and overwriting without authentication by the Registering Officer, the evidentiary value ordinarily attached to registration stands considerably weakened.

Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the cumulative effect of the unexplained disinheritance of the widow, the doubtful recitals in the Will, the unexplained alterations in the registration endorsement and the surrounding circumstances prevented the Court from accepting the Will as the free and voluntary act of the Testator.

ISSUE III: WHETHER THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 100 OF THE CPC?

The Appellant contended that the findings regarding the existence of suspicious circumstances and the genuineness of the Will were concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court, which could not be disturbed in a second appeal absent perversity or a substantial question of law. Reliance was placed upon Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal, Rur Singh v. Bachan Kaur, and Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that Section 100 of the CPC, 1908 confines the jurisdiction of the High Court to substantial questions of law and does not permit a re-appreciation of evidence merely because another view is possible. The existence of suspicious circumstances surrounding a Will and the sufficiency of the explanation offered by its propounder are essentially questions of fact and cannot ordinarily be reopened in a second appeal unless the concurrent findings are shown to be perverse or based upon an erroneous application of law. 

Applying these principles, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court had exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC by reassessing the evidence and substituting its own conclusions despite there being no perversity in the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court was set aside. 

COURT’S DECISION 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court decided to:

• allowed the Civil Appeal; 
• set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Hon’ble High Court; 
• restored the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court; and held that the Respondents had failed to establish the genuineness of the Will after removing the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution

CONCLUSION

• This judgment reaffirms the settled principles governing proof of a Will under the Succession Act and the Evidence Act by reiterating that compliance with the statutory requirements relating to execution and attestation merely establishes the formal validity of the testament. Where the execution of a Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, the propounder bears a substantially higher burden of proving its genuineness by removing every legitimate suspicion and satisfying the judicial conscience of the Court.
• Equally significant is the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the limited scope of interference under Section 100 of the CPC. The judgment reiterates that concurrent findings of fact, particularly those founded upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, cannot ordinarily be disturbed in a second appeal unless they are shown to be perverse or based upon a substantial error of law. The decision therefore serves as an important precedent both on the law relating to testamentary succession and the appellate jurisdiction of the High Courts.

 

Written by: Sakshi