Sentencing is the final stage of criminal justice system. Once guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt, the Court must translate that finding into an appropriate quantum of punishment, and it does so without any statutory formula. The result, has long been observed, is in the wide discretion vested in Courts and consequent disparity in sentences awarded for materially similar offences, with the outcome often turning as much on the individual philosophy of the judge as on the facts of the case. Yet, in exercising this discretion, a Court is expected to operate the sentencing system in such a way that the sentence imposed reflects the conscience of society and responds to society’s cry for justice against the offender. This article traces the doctrinal foundation for this exercise to the principle of just desert and the doctrine of proportionality.

The Absence of a Sentencing Formula:

The starting point for any discussion of sentencing in India is the absence of a uniform policy. Awarding a sentence is not a mere formality. Where a statute permits the Court a choice between a maximum and a minimum, some degree of discretion necessarily follows, and that discretion cannot be exercised carelessly or as a matter of course. It is precisely within this space, left open by the absence of legislative guidance, that the underlying philosophies of punishment, retributive, deterrent, reformative, and rehabilitative, acquire particular significance, since it is these philosophies, informed by the judge’s own assessment of the case, and not any fixed formula, that ultimately guide the Court’s hand. Even so, the Courts have consistently held that this discretion must be exercised along accepted judicial lines, and not arbitrarily.

Types of Punishments:

Every penal statute prescribes the punishments an offender may be liable to and often fixes a minimum below which a Court may not go. For example, Section 4 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”), sets out the punishments available under that Sanhita:

“4. Punishments – The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Sanhita are—
(a) Death;
(b) Imprisonment for life;
(c) Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:—
(1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour;
(2) Simple;
(d) Forfeiture of property;
(e) Fine;
(f) Community Service.”

Section 4 of the BNS (erstwhile Section 53, Indian Penal Code, 1860, (“IPC”)) sets the outer boundary of what a judge can impose once guilt is proved. The list itself is a limit on discretion; a judge can only choose from the options listed above.

Judicial Discretion, Limits and Standards:

The power to award a sentence lies, in the first instance, with the Ld. Trial Court. It is the Trial Court that records the finding of guilt and is best placed to assess both the offence and the offender at first hand; appellate interference with that assessment remains the exception rather than the rule. Once the prosecution’s case is accepted and a finding of guilt is recorded, the nature of the evidence that led to conviction has no further bearing on the sentence to follow. What the Court considers at the sentencing stage is whether mitigating or aggravating circumstances exist. Punishment is the means by which the state enforces the law against offenders, and sentencing must have regard to the totality of these circumstances so that the punishment imposed is both appropriate and just. A sentence imposed without regard to its effect on the social order defeats its own purpose.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Deo Narain Mandal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 257, made the following observations regarding the nature and exercise of judicial discretion and its exercise by a Court:

“...Where the statute has given the Court a choice of sentence with maximum and minimum limit presented then an element of discretion is vested with the Court.
This discretion cannot be exercised arbitrarily or whimsically. It will have to be exercised taking into consideration the gravity of offence, the manner in which it is committed, the age, the sex of the accused, in other words the sentence to be awarded will have to be considered in the background of the fact of each case and the Court while doing so should bear in mind the principle of proportionality. The sentence awarded should be neither excessively harsh nor ridiculously low.”

The extent to which the power to impose appropriate punishment lies within the discretion of the Trial Court was explained by the Supreme Court in Bed Raj v. State of U.P., (1955) 2 SCC 145, where the Court considered the power of the appellate Court to enhance a sentence already imposed:

“A question of a sentence is a matter of discretion and it is well-settled that when discretion has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an Appellate Court should not interfere to the detriment of the accused person except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed on the face of the judgment …in a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is called for only when it is manifestly inadequate.”

After a thorough examination of precedents, the Supreme Court in Ehsaan v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1356 (delivered by Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih), reiterated that sentencing serves a three-fold purpose, punitive, deterrent and protective, and set out the following relevant factors to the sentencing exercise, including:

a. Be in accordance with the nature and gravity of the crime;
b. Adequately protect the interest of society;
c. Take into account the deterrent purpose of punishment;
d. Consider the motive behind the crime, if any;
e. Give due weight to the conduct of the accused;
f. Examine whether the crime in question was pre-meditated or not;
g. Keep in view the age of the accused and whether he has engaged in any similar offence in the past for which he has been duly convicted;
h. Account for the number of victims of the offence;
i. Not consider the religion, race, caste or creed of the offender as a factor;
j. Consider the possibility of reformation of the accused, the burden of establishing that such reformation is not possible lying on the State; and
k. The abuse of trust or misuse of a personal relationship, if any.

These factors provide a summarisation of the accepted judicial lines which the Trial Court is expected to follow in the exercise of its sentencing discretion. However, the Hon’ble Court further clarified that these factors are illustrative and not exhaustive, and that a holistic view of the entire case must be taken in the particular facts and circumstances of each matter.

Principle of Just Desert and Doctrine of Proportionality:

The principle of just desert holds that punishment must be measured strictly against what the offender deserves for the offence committed. It rests on the idea that the offender’s own conduct sets the ceiling and the floor of the punishment that may justly be imposed, so that the sentence is neither an act of excessive retribution nor one of misplaced leniency. The doctrine of proportionality is the operative expression of this idea in sentencing: it requires the Court to calibrate the punishment to the gravity of the offence, so that the punishment remains proportionate to the gravity of the offense.
Emphasising the importance of proportionate sentencing in the administration of criminal justice, the Supreme Court, in Shivu & Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka & Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 713, observed:

“The principle of proportion between crime and punishment is a principle of just desert that serves as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable. As a principle of criminal justice, it is hardly less familiar or less important than the principle that only the guilty ought to be punished. Indeed, the requirement that punishment not be disproportionately great, which is a corollary of just desert, is dictated by the same principle that does not allow punishment of the innocent, for any punishment in excess of what is deserved for the criminal conduct is punishment without guilt.”

In Ehsaan v. State (supra), the Appellant had been convicted for the offence of Gang rape under Section 376D IPC (Section 70 BNS) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life, along with a fine, a sentence that stood affirmed in appeal by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court, satisfied the doctrine of proportionality or not, in the particular facts and circumstances. While deliberating on the issue, the following precedents were examined on the application of the doctrine of proportionality to sentencing:

Case & Citation:

Case & Citation	Relevant Para(s).
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24	“36. … If a law provides for imposition of a sentence which is disproportionate to the offence, it would be arbitrary and irrational, for it would not pass the test of reason and would be contrary to the rule of law and void under Articles 14, 19 and 21. The principle of proportionality is implicit in these three Articles of the Constitution. …”
Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2021) 20 SCC 24	“35. …It must be candidly acknowledged that there is an element of discretion present while adjudicating the issue of sentence, however, the same cannot be exercised in an unprincipled manner. … 36. The sentencing policy, therefore, keeps pace with changing time. Undoubtedly, the primary emphasis while deciding the quantum of sentence should lie on the gravity or penal value of the offence. However, other guiding elements of rehabilitative justice model, including, appreciation of grounds for mitigation of sentence also deserve to be duly considered within the permissible limits of judicial discretion. The awarding of just and proportionate sentence remains the solemn duty of the Courts and they should not be swayed by non-relevant factors while deciding the quantum of sentence. Naturally, what factors should be considered as “relevant” or “non-relevant” will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no straitjacket formula can be laid down for the same.”
State of Karnataka v. Krishnappa, (2000) 4 SCC 75	“18. … Crimes of violence upon women need to be severely dealt with. The socio-economic status, religion, race, caste or creed of the accused or the victim are irrelevant considerations in sentencing policy. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is the avowed object of law and that is required to be achieved by imposing an appropriate sentence. The sentencing Courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. Courts must hear the loud cry for justice by the society in cases of the heinous crime of rape on innocent helpless girls of tender years, as in this case, and respond by imposition of proper sentence. Public abhorrence of the crime needs reflection through imposition of appropriate sentence by the Court.”

In light of these precedents and while emphasizing that the offence was heinous and constituted an offence not only against the victim but also against society at large, the Court proceeded to weigh the following circumstances in considering the appropriateness of the sentence on the facts of the case:

a. the Appellant had no criminal antecedents;
b. the was only 25 years old at the time of the commission of the offence;
c. his young age indicated a possibility of reformation;
d. the State had neither placed any material on record to show that reformation was not possible nor disputed the Appellant’s claim that he had maintained good conduct during the nearly ten years (including remission) since his conviction.

The Court further observed that Section 376D IPC, introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 in the aftermath of the Nirbhaya incident, prescribes a minimum sentence of twenty years, with no discretion available to the Court to go below this statutory mandate upon conviction. In light of the above, the appeal in Ehsaan (supra) was partly allowed, and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for the remainder of the Appellant’s natural life was modified to rigorous imprisonment for twenty years, with the benefit of remission.

Conclusion:

The principle of just desert and the doctrine of proportionality remain the guiding framework available to the Trial Court that has no fixed formula for sentencing. They neither eliminate discretion, nor do they promise consistency across cases, but do insist that discretion be exercised according to the gravity of the offence, weighed against the offender’s own circumstances, and along accepted judicial lines, as enumerated above, rather than as a matter of individual disposition. The Trial Court remains the primary forum for this exercise, with appellate intervention reserved for cases where the sentencing discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or in disregard of the doctrine of proportionality.
Equally important, the enactment of a uniform sentencing policy, though desirable for promoting consistency, cannot altogether eliminate judicial discretion. Criminal offences rarely present themselves in identical factual scenarios. The manner of commission, the motive, the conduct of the accused, the impact upon the victim, the possibility of reformation, and numerous other considerations vary from case to case. Therefore, even if a detailed sentencing framework were to be formulated, it would necessarily leave room for a judicial evaluation of factors that, as recognised by the Supreme Court, depend upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case.

Written by : Saksham Singh